MODIFYING THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTON MODEL TO CALCULATE THE COST OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS
Despite its well-recognized limitations, the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model with only mild adjustments continues to be the overwhelming choice of public firms who must report the cost of their employee stock options (ESOs) Most public firms using the BSM model simply adjust the time to expiration to calculate the cost of their ESOs. Several more complex models have been designed to incorporate more accurately the ESO's special vesting, transfer restriction, early exercise, and forfeiture features, and there has been at least one promising attempt to design a suitable tracking security to obtain market prices for measuring ESO expense.
Market prices for ESOs do not exist because ESO transfer is tightly restricted, if it is
permitted at all. Zions Bancorporation has created an ESO tracking security, called Employee Stock Ownership Appreciation Rights Securities (ESOARS), whose payoff is designed to mimic the payoff on a reference pool of vested ESOs (Balsam, 2007, and Zions, 2008) . 2 With the exception of this one tracking security, there are no market-traded close substitutes that could provide market prices. 3 Until public firms embrace the ESOARS tracking security or develop another marketbased alternative, they will continue to rely on models to value their ESOs. FAS 123(R) does not endorse any specific valuation model but most firms use the Black-Scholes (1973) model as modified by Merton (1973) to incorporate dividends at a continuous constant proportional rate (hereafter BSM model). Table 1 shows that at year-end 2008, 388 (or 81%) of the S&P 500 firms that issued ESOs used the BSM model to calculate their ESO expense for all their ESOs, 66 (14%) used a lattice model, one used Monte Carlo simulation for all its ESOs, three firms (1%) issue different types of ESOs and reported using a Monte-Carlo model to value performance-based ESOs and the BSM model for the rest, one (Zions Bancorporation) used an auction process, and the other 19 (4%) did not identify the specific model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly reviews the ESO pricing literature and describes my contribution. Section II develops the modified BSM model. Section III describes the exercise and forfeiture data and calibrates the modified BSM model. Section IV uses the modified BSM model to value ESOs for a sample of firms and compares modified BSM model pricing to trinomial lattice model and µ lattice model pricing. Section V concludes.
I. ESO Valuation Models
FAS 123(R) explicitly permits firms to use either the BSM model or a lattice model to value ESOs (in the absence of market prices). The BSM model assumes that the call options and the underlying publicly traded common stock trade in liquid markets. ESOs differ from equity call options in four critical respects: (1) ESOs are either nontransferable or else transferable subject to severe restrictions; (2) ESOs are subject to vesting requirements; (3) ESOs are subject to forfeiture or forced early exercise if an employee terminates employment due to dismissal, retirement, death or disability, or voluntary termination; and (4) employees tend to exercise
ESOs earlier than they would be expected to exercise unrestricted options because of transfer restrictions, limited employee wealth diversification, and risk aversion. Several studies have documented ESO early exercise (Hemmer, Matsunaga and Shevlin, 1994; Huddart, 1994; Kulatilaka and Marcos, 1994; Rubinstein, 1995; Huddart and Lang, 1996; Pandher, 2003; and Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005) .
The seminal ESO valuation paper, Smith and Zimmerman (1976) , applied the BSM model to measure the firm's cost of ESOs. Numerous papers have pointed out that the unadjusted BSM model overvalues ESOs unless it is properly adjusted for their special features (Rubinstein, 1995; Carpenter, 1998; Carr and Linetsky, 2000; Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005; and Finnerty, 2005) . To address this limitation of the BSM model, Jennergren and Naslund (1993) , Cuny and Jorion (1995), and Finnerty (2005) adapt the BSM model to value ESOs by adjusting for specific ESO features.
In practice, firms usually simply substitute the expected term of the ESOs for the time to expiration, as permitted by FAS 123(R). This is a rather crude adjustment because it attempts to capture the effects of all four special features in a single modification. Nevertheless, Marquardt (2002) finds that the BSM model is capable of providing reasonable estimates of the ex post ESO cost to the firm, on average, when the BSM model values are properly adjusted for the concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga and Shevlin (1994) procedure. However, large errors can still occur on an option-by-option basis. Finnerty (2005) finds that the BSM model with the simple time-to-exercise adjustment can lead to a reasonable approximation to the firm's cost of ESOs for low-volatility stocks but still tends to overstate the cost for highvolatility stocks, such as the stocks of technology firms that have made heavy use of ESOs in their employee compensation programs.
Most of the more recent ESO valuation models are modified binomial models (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, 1979) . Huddart (1994) , Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994) , Rubinstein (1995) , Carpenter (1998) , and Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) develop models that determine utilitymaximizing ESO exercise behavior and measure the cost of ESOs under the assumption that ESO holders behave optimally but are constrained from selling their ESOs or hedging their ESO risks. Carpenter (1998) , Pandher (2003) , Hull and White (2004) , Bajaj et al. (2006) , and Brisley and Anderson (2008) develop simpler non-utility-based binomial models. Carpenter (1998) assumes an exogenous stopping rate at which exercise occurs if the ESO is in-the-money and forfeiture occurs otherwise. Pandher (2003) incorporates random early exercise and forfeiture from employee departure events but he omits early exercise, which occurs (to achieve liquidity for ESO holdings) when employees do not exit the firm. Hull and White (2004) assume an exogenous constant employee exit rate, which is analogous to Carpenter's stopping rate, and an exogenous constant early exercise multiple (of the strike price) at which voluntary exercise occurs with certainty. However, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) The models are more difficult to implement than a closed-form model or a lattice model because they require a numerical solution. I develop a closed-form model that is in the spirit of Carr and Linetsky's model by introducing constant exercise and forfeiture intensities into the BSM model. Ammann and Seiz (2004) compare several ESO valuation models. They find that except for the standard BSM model and the permitted FAS 123(R) simplification, the various models provide consistent pricing when they are all calibrated to the same expected term. The BSM model can also provide consistent pricing when it is properly adjusted for the special features of ESOs and calibrated to the available exercise and forfeiture data (Finnerty, 2005) . Given the long history of the BSM model in option valuation and its usefulness for financial reporting purposes, it remains a good starting point for ESO valuation.
II. Modified BSM Model
Generally accepted accounting principles recognize that a firm purchases an employee's services partly by substituting nontransferable call options on its stock for cash compensation.
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The FASB and IASB accounting standards provide guidance on measuring the firms's cost of purchasing employee services (FASB, 2004, and IASB, 2004) . They use the 'fair value' of ESOs to measure the cost to the firm's shareholders of issuing equity claims to pay off these ESO obligations when the ESO holders choose to exercise.
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Accordingly, FAS 123(R) does not allow firms to apply a discount to the BSM value to reflect ESOs' lack of transferability during the vesting period. It directs firms to use the expected term of the ESO, rather than the contractual term, to allow for early exercise and post-vesting forfeiture. This adjustment only takes into account the lack of transferability post-vesting.
I model the cost of nonqualified stock options (NQSOs). NQSOs are call options to purchase common stock that are exercisable beginning on the vesting date and ending on the expiration date. Most ESO plans are fixed plans: the number of shares of stock the employee can receive upon option exercise and the exercise price per share are fixed on the grant date. The
ESOs are almost always issued at-the-money: the exercise price equals the market price of the stock (or its fair market value if the firm is private) at the time of grant. The pay-forperformance incentives for risk averse, undiversified employees are usually maximized when the firm issues ESOs at-the-money because the option's time premium is greatest at that strike price (Hall and Murphy, 2000) . In most fixed plans, the time to expiration is 10 years.
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ESOs become American-style call options when they vest. Vesting is of two types. All
ESOs granted on the same date vest at the same time under cliff vesting, but they vest in stages under graded vesting, which is more common. Four-year pro-rata graded vesting is typical: 25 percent of the options vest on the first anniversary of the grant date, and an additional 25 percent vest on each of the second through the fourth anniversaries. Graded vesting is handled within my model by treating the option grant as a set of separate grants, one for each vesting date.
A. Vesting and Early Exercise
Following Carpenter (1998) and Carr and Linetsky (2000) , I assume that the firm's shareholders are fully diversified with respect to ESO risk; the firm's ESO liabilities account for no more than an inconsequential fraction of each shareholder's total wealth, and any ESO risk that the shareholder cannot hedge with the underlying common stock is idiosyncratic across the securities in the shareholder's portfolio and can be diversified away. Since idiosyncratic risk is not priced in a fully diversified portfolio, ESOs can be valued within a risk-neutral framework based on their expected payoffs.
An employee cannot exercise unvested ESOs. If an employee leaves the firm before her ESOs vest, they automatically expire worthless. At the grant date, there is some fraction of the newly granted ESOs that can be expected to vest. A(T V ) is the probability that an ESO vests at T V . Thus, 1 -A(T V ) is the probability that the employee will leave the firm prior to vesting and that the ESOs will expire worthless. This risk cannot be hedged but under the assumption that it is idiosyncratic, the firm's shareholders can diversify it away.
Forfeiture can also occur after vesting. Many ESO plans provide that after vesting, the employee must forfeit any unexercised ESOs if terminated for cause. Employees might also voluntarily forfeit ESOs, for example, if they voluntarily resign and do not exercise the ESOs within the allowed period or cannot exercise them because their departure falls within a blackout period.
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However, if the ESOs are vested and in-the-money, employees usually exercise early rather than forfeit. As a result, the forfeiture rate decreases substantially after vesting.
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Involuntary early exercise of in-the-money ESOs is captured by the exercise rate in my model.
Any forced forfeitures of ESOs post-vesting are captured by a separate forfeiture rate. To allow for both types of forfeiture, I specify F 1 before vesting and F 2 after vesting.
An ESO holder might desire liquidity in order to diversify the employee's personal investment portfolio, to exercise and sell after the stock has appreciated significantly (due to the holder's risk aversion and inability to hedge against a price decline), to generate cash for consumption purposes, or to meet other personal needs. Early exercise may be especially important for those executives whose wealth is predominantly tied to the ESO issuer's fortunes. Huddart and Lang (1996) analyze the exercise behavior of more than 50,000 employees at eight firms and find that employees sacrificed roughly half the BSM value by exercising a large fraction of their ESOs several years before the expiration date. Carpenter (1998) examines proxy data for 40 executive ESO grants mainly by large manufacturing firms and computes an average time to exercise of 5.8 years. These empirical findings indicate significant early exercise because almost all plans at the time of these studies issued 10-year ESOs. Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) find that ESO exercise tends to occur on average about two years after vesting and four years before expiration.
If liquidity is worth less to an employee than the remaining time value, the employee will delay exercising. The employee exercises when the value of liquidity first exceeds the remaining time value. At the moment of early exercise, the two values are equal. Thus, it is possible to adjust fully for the lack of transferability after vesting by reducing the time to expiration sufficiently in the valuation model or by reducing the exercise multiple in the lattice model in the years prior to expiration (Brisley and Anderson, 2008) . Such adjustments indirectly take into account the ESO holders' wealth endowments and risk aversion because these factors affect the value of liquidity.
B. Modified BSM Formula
I modify the BSM model to explicitly account for ESO vesting, transfer restrictions, forfeiture, and early exercise. I model exercise and forfeiture as mean-reverting stochastic processes. I validate the assumed form of the stochastic processes and show how to estimate the exercise and forfeiture parameters later in the paper.
is the BSM value as of time t of a European call option, which expires at T, in the absence of any vesting, transfer, or other restrictions; S t is the underlying share price at t when the share is also free of any transfer restrictions; X is the exercise price; r is the riskless rate; q is the average annualized continuous dividend yield (q = 0 for non-dividendpaying stocks); and s  is the stock price volatility. The current share price and the current option price for call options that are free of any restrictions are S 0 and V 0 , respectively. For the special case of a non-dividend-paying share, V is given by the Black-Scholes (1973) call option formula. Merton's (1973) generalization of the Black-Scholes model to value options on stocks that provide a continuous dividend yield q can be used to value unrestricted European call options on dividend-paying shares.
Next I develop a closed-form expression for the value of an ESO. It is convenient to proceed first in discrete time and then let the length of the time step approach zero to obtain a continuous time model.
E
V is the value of the ESO, which vests at T V and expires at T E .
Holders may exercise anytime between T V and T E . E* is the instantaneous risk-neutral probability the holder exercises the ESO conditional on it being vested and in-the-money and not having been exercised or forfeited previously. F 1 * is the instantaneous risk-neutral probability the holder forfeits the ESO during the vesting period conditional on it not having been exercised or forfeited previously. F 2 * is the instantaneous risk-neutral probability of involuntary forfeiture after the ESO vests conditional on it not having been exercised or forfeited previously. I assume that E* is constant throughout the life of the ESO, and that F 1 * is constant during the pre-vesting period, F 2 * is constant during the post-vesting period, and both are zero otherwise. E*, F 1 *, and F 2 * are thus the long-run average proportional exercise rate and forfeiture rates, respectively.
They are equivalent to the constant exercise and forfeiture intensities in Carr and Linetsky's (2000) occupation time model. 12 E*, F 1 *, and F 2 * can be modeled as the long-run averages of separate mean-reverting stochastic processes in order to capture the random nature of these variables, which is due to the random nature of stock prices and to the variety of idiosyncratic factors that affect individual ESO exercise and forfeiture decisions.
I assume that of the ESOs the holder would be expected to exercise over the life of the ESOs if he remained an employee through T E , he can be expected to exercise a fraction of which are expected to be exercised between T V + Δ and T V + 2Δ if they are in-the-money, and so on. The value of each of these vested ESOs can be approximated using the BSM formula by assuming that ESO exercise occurs on the discrete end dates T V + Δ, T V + 2Δ, and so on.
Pick N and set ∆ = (T E -T V )/N. V E at the time of grant can be expressed as
where T n T V n T E T V /N, T 0 = T V , T N = T E , and * T E P is the fraction of the original grant expected to be held to term and exercised at T E . The value of a call option with expiration T n conditional on its being in-the-money at T n is V/N(d 2 ), the BSM value divided by the likelihood the ESO will be in-the-money. The probability it will be in-the-money and exercised at T n is
, the probability it is exercised conditional on its being in-the-money times the probability it is in-the-money. )
is the probability that T n is the stopping time due to early exercise. Thus, the value of the fraction of the original grant that is expected to be exercised at T n if they are in-the-money is   . In a risk-neutral world, the fraction of ESOs that are expected to vest at T V is
The fraction of ESOs that will vest that are expected to be exercised between T n and T n + Δ if they are in-the-money is
Any ESOs that have not been exercised or forfeited prior to T E will be exercised immediately if they are in-the-money; otherwise they will expire unexercised. The fraction of the original grant that vests, is held to term, and is expected to be exercised if it is in-the-money at T E is
Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (1) and simplifying leads to the following expression for the modified BSM value of ESOs that are scheduled to vest on T V :
The ESO value equals the weighted sum of the BSM values corresponding to the assumed exercise dates, each evaluated at the current share price, the actual strike price, the adjusted risk-free rate, and the adjusted dividend rate. The weighted average of BSM values is multiplied by the fraction of ESOs that are expected to vest, which is calculated separately using equation (2) to conform to FAS 123(R). Because of vesting restrictions, forfeiture can occur but exercise cannot prior to T V . The risk-free rate and the dividend rate are both incremented by the risk-neutral long-run average proportional exercise rate E* and the post-vesting risk-neutral long-run average proportional forfeiture rate F 2 *. Each adjustment applies to the fraction of the time to exercise (T n -T V )/T n that follows the vesting date. Replacing q with effectively causes S to decrease at the continuously compounded rate q prior to vesting and at the continuously compounded rate q + [E * + F 2 available for exercise at any particular T n .
14 Similarly, replacing r with r effectively causes the present value of the exercise price to decrease at the continuously compounded rate r prior to vesting and at the continuously compounded rate r
C. Value of ESOs at the Grant Date Assuming No Blackout Periods
Equation (5A) can be written in continuous time by taking the limit as N→∞ to obtain:
The appendix evaluates this integral to obtain a general closed-form expression for the value of an ESO subject to early exercise and forfeiture risk.
ESOs are almost always issued at-the-money. The value at the grant date of an at-themoney ESO is obtained by setting
, and equation (A5) simplifies to
If the ESO is written on a non-dividend-paying stock, set
The value of an ESO equals the likelihood it vests ) ( V T A times the value conditional on its vesting. This conditional value has two components in equation (7A). The first is the BSM value of a call option set to expire at T E , which is adjusted downward for the likelihood that the ESO will be either exercised or forfeited between T V and T E and thus not be available for exercise at T E if the ESO is in-the-money. The second component is the value due to early exercise, which equals the exercise rate E* conditional on the ESO being in-the-money at the time of early exercise times the probability-weighted expected time to early exercise. Equation (7) that are expected to vest on T V to obtain the value of the batch of ESOs that will vest on that date. Sum the resulting values to obtain the total value of the grant.
The ESO price obtained from equation (7) is less than the BSM value due to early exercise and forfeiture. The greater the rate of early exercise, the greater the sacrifice of remaining time value and consequently the greater is the difference between the BSM value and the modified BSM model price (7). Similarly, the greater the forfeiture rate either before or after vesting, the greater is the difference between the BSM value and the modified BSM model price (7). I show in the empirical section of the paper that the forfeiture rate is greater prior to vesting with the result that pre-vesting forfeiture has the greater impact on the difference between the BSM value and the modified BSM model price (7).
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The model is easily programmed into an Excel spreadsheet or a hand-held calculator. It requires only 10 parameter values: the current share price ( 0 S in the model), the exercise price (X), the riskless rate (r), the dividend yield (q), the stock price volatility ( s  ), time to expiration adjustment. In any case, once the ESO grant has been announced, its dilutive effect will be reflected in the firm's share price and a dilution adjustment to E V is no longer needed.
E. Effect of Blackout Periods
Many public firms specify blackout periods during which executives and sometimes other employees are prohibited from exercising vested ESOs. For example, a firm might limit senior executive ESO exercise to the two weeks following each quarterly earnings announcement. Blackout policies exhibit substantial firm-to-firm variation (Mun, 2004) .
Traditional manufacturing firms often have only brief blackout periods that precede earnings and other material announcements whereas biotechnology, computer software, and other high-tech firms have blackout periods that may extend six weeks or longer each quarter (Mun, 2004) .
Blackout periods increase the post-vesting forfeiture rate F 2 * when they prevent ESO holders who terminate their employment from exercising in-the-money ESOs before departing.
The impact depends on the fraction of the year that is blacked out. If it is just a brief period around each quarterly earnings announcement, then the impact on forfeitures, exercise, and ESO value will be inconsequential because employees will be able to exercise outside these brief periods. However, blackout periods can reduce ESO value if the restrictions are severe enough to raise the post-vesting forfeiture rate and reduce the exercise rate.
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Employees will forfeit ESOs at a higher rate due to the blackouts because they will not be able to exercise if they leave the firm during a blackout period. The actual impact on the exercise and forfeiture rates can be measured by calibrating the model to exercise and forfeiture data for firms with similar blackout periods.
III. Calibration of the Model
ESO exercise and forfeiture are stochastic. This section models these diffusions and explains how to calibrate the modified BSM model.
A. Exercise and Forfeiture Diffusions
I model the conditional exercise and forfeiture probabilities as mean-reverting diffusion processes and calculate the risk-neutral long-run average conditional exercise and forfeiture probabilities E*, F 1 *, and F 2 * for these processes. This procedure uses historical exercise and forfeiture data for a sample of 10 firms. It is subject to the important caveat that historical data may not provide reliable measures of future exercise and forfeiture rates unless the sample of firms is large enough, the time period covered is long enough to include a full market cycle, and the stochastic processes are stable.
E t and F t are the annual conditional exercise and forfeiture probabilities, respectively.
Each is expressed with respect to the number of available ESOs. First, I estimate E′, F 1 ′, and F 2 ′, the long-run average conditional exercise and forfeiture probabilities, respectively, from the diffusion models
Estimate equation (9) Tables 2 and 3 Tables 2 and 3 go here   Table 2 provides average annual exercise percentages by firm, where the averages are calculated across the grant years for which each firm provided data. Since a firm might make multiple grants at different times during the year, I aggregated all the grants made during the calendar year. This approach gives rise to some imprecision in measuring the amount of time that has elapsed between the time of grant and the time of exercise. However, there are a total of 24 grant years among the 10 firms between 1981 and 2004 (which span the exercise data), so the results in Table 2 are at least broadly indicative of the general time pattern of ESO exercise.
B. Exercise and Forfeiture Data
All 10 ESO plans in my sample granted 10-year ESOs, and eight of the 10 provided for graded vesting. Four-year graded vesting with 25 percent of the ESOs vesting on the first four annual anniversaries of the grant date is most common. Accordingly, holders could exercise ESOs as early as the first calendar year after the year of grant, and some ESO holders did exercise this early, as evident in Table 2 . Table 2 provides the average percentage of the number of vested and available (vested, unexercised, non-forfeited, and in-the-money) ESOs that holders exercised each year after grant.
The average is calculated as the arithmetic average across grant years for firm i:
where E ijt is the number of ESOs firm i granted in year j that holders exercised in year t, V ijt is the total number of ESOs firm i granted in year j that vested by the end of year t and were in-themoney during the year, t -1 ijt 1 E  is the total number of vested ESOs from the available grants that holders exercised through the end of the prior calendar year, VF ijt is the number of ESOs from the available grants that firm i granted in year j which holders forfeited in year t,
 is the total number of vested ESOs from the available grants that holders forfeited through the end of the prior calendar year, and J is the number of grant years included in the data set for firm i for which exercise data are available for year t. The denominator in equation (12) represents the number of ESOs that are available for exercise during year t taking into account the ESOs that have vested previously or that will vest during the year and after subtracting all previously exercised ESOs and all vested ESOs that holders forfeited through the end of the prior calendar year.
18 Table 2 quantifies ESO holders' tendency to exercise early. On average 4.47% of the vested ESOs that are eligible (in-the-money and not previously exercised or forfeited) are exercised within one year of the grant, 10.93% are exercised the second year, 12.74% the third year, 14.32% the fourth year, 18.58% the fifth year, and so on. The average time to exercise is 4.82 years. More than 50 percent of the ESOs were exercised by the end of the fifth calendar year after grant.
The forfeiture data are provided in Table 3 . As with the exercise data, these firms furnished data for a total of 24 grant years and 1,308,528,739 ESOs. The latest grant year is 2004, and the forfeiture data cover the period through 2007. As with the exercise data, I aggregated the grants within each calendar year. Table 3 provides the average percentage of the remaining ESOs that holders forfeited in year t. The average is calculated as the arithmetic average across grant years for firm i:
where F ijt is the number of ESOs firm i granted in year j that holders forfeited in year t, N ij is the total number of ESOs firm i originally granted in year j, E ijt is again the number of ESOs firm i granted in year j that holders exercised in year t, and J is the number of grant years included in the data set for firm i for which forfeiture data are available for year t. The denominator in equation (13) represents the number of ESOs that remain after subtracting from the total number originally granted both the number of ESOs previously exercised and the number previously forfeited.
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The average forfeiture rate is 4.51% the first year, 7.05% the second year, 5.16% the third year, 2.92% the fourth year, 2.03% the fifth year, and less than 0.40% in each of the remaining years except the last when it is just under 1%. Thus, the average forfeiture rates fall in the range from 2% to 7% per year prior to vesting, decline thereafter, and are a small fraction of 1% for most years after vesting.
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They exhibit a less pronounced time pattern than the average exercise percentages in Table 2 , and they do not vary from firm to firm as much as the exercise patterns.
C. Parameter Estimation
I use the conditional exercise and forfeiture probabilities to fit equations (8) Volatility is the most difficult parameter to estimate, particularly for ESOs whose time to expiration far exceeds the times to expiration of traded call options. Hull and Suo (2002) describe the implied volatility function model that option market participants use to infer volatilities for long-term options from the implied volatilities of short-term traded options. Table 4 provides the parameter estimates for the exercise diffusions, and Table 5 provides the estimates for the forfeiture diffusions. The parameters were estimated using the GaussNewton method for generalized nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation (Berndt et al., 1974) .
There were inadequate data to achieve convergence for the maximum likelihood estimations for one of the exercise and two of the forfeiture processes.
Tables 4 and 5 go here
The mean-reversion speeds, long-run mean exercise and pre-vesting forfeiture rates, and volatilities are nearly all significantly different from zero, which supports the choice of meanreverting stochastic models. However, only one of the eight long-run mean post-vesting forfeiture rates is significantly different from zero at conventional levels. This suggests that ESO holders generally exercise their ESOs before departing the firm if they are in-the-money, rather than forfeiting them.
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. 0   E based on the data for the full sample. F 1 =0.073 and F 2 ′=0.0043 based on the data for the firms in Table 3 . I assume that 
IV. Estimating the Cost of ESOs
I illustrate the usefulness of the model with a simple example. I then compare the accuracy of the modified BSM and trinomial lattice models in pricing ESOs for the sample of 10 firms. Third, I compare the pricing from these models to the simple BSM model adjustment FAS 123(R) recommends.
A. Example
I assume 4-year graded vesting. When the ESO plan specifies annual graded vesting spread equally over the vesting period, divide the number of originally granted ESOs into T V equal groups that vest sequentially in years 1, 2, …, T V . To value the ESOs as of the grant date, apply equation (7) exercise the third year, 13.68 percent the fourth year, and 18.24 percent each year beginning in the fifth year in a risk-neutral world. The firm would prorate this expense over the 4-year vesting period and report first year ESO expense equal to $4,801,875 (= 19,207,500/4). Table 6 goes here Figure 1 illustrates the sensitivity of the cost of a vested ESO to variation in the exercise rate E* and the rate of forfeiture post-vesting F 2 * and highlights the trade-off between these two factors. ESO cost decreases as E* increases when F 2 * is low but it increases as E* increases when F 2 * is high because early exercise preserves value that would otherwise be lost due to forfeiture post-vesting. Figure 2 holds F 2 * constant and displays the sensitivity of ESO cost to early exercise E* and the rate of forfeiture pre-vesting F 1 *, both of which adversely affect ESO cost. Table 7 . and White model assumes an employee exercises the option early whenever the stock price reaches a fixed multiple of the strike price, the µ model assumes an employee exercises the option early whenever she can capture a fixed proportion µ of the ESO's remaining unadjusted BSM value. As a result, the voluntary exercise boundary is horizontal in the Hull and White model but is downward-sloping in the µ model, which is consistent with empirical evidence in the ESO is exercised whenever the intrinsic value of the option is great than or equal to the fraction µ of the remaining unadjusted BSM value.
As reported in Table 7 , the modified BSM, trinomial lattice, and µ models produce generally consistent valuations (when there are no blackout periods). 
C. Potential Impact of Blackout Periods
Blackout periods can reduce ESO value if the restrictions are severe enough to raise the post-vesting forfeiture rate and reduce the exercise rate. In the extreme, it seems reasonable to assume that employees will forfeit ESOs during the blackout periods at no more than the rate they did before the ESOs vested. A lower bound on ESO cost in the presence of blackout periods can be gauged by replacing F in equations (6) and (7).
22 Table 8 quantifies the potential impact of blackout periods by increasing the post-vesting forfeiture rate F 2 * and recalculating ESO cost for the nine firms in Table 7 . All nine firms had blackout periods but they were limited to a brief period before a quarterly earnings release lasting from a few days to a few weeks and a period of up to a week following the earnings release to allow the market for its stock time to adjust fully to the news. The impact on forfeiture should be very small in such cases because ESO holders can time their exercise to avoid these restrictions and avoid forfeiting. With more severe blackout restrictions, the effect would be greater, and the maximum potential impact when F 1 * replaces F 2 * averages approximately 24%.
While it is difficult to infer the impact for any single firm because of the substantial variation in firm's blackout practices, the discounts in Table 8 appear consistent with Mun's (2004) conclusion that the impact is generally between zero and 20%. Calibrating the model using historical data for the firm (or using data from comparable firms with similar blackout periods) will lead to more reliable ESO cost estimates, which better reflect the impact of any particular firm's blackout policy. Table 8 goes here
D. Reasonableness of the Adjustments FAS 123(R) Permits
Firms can calculate ESO expense under FAS 123(R) by reducing the BSM value for the fraction of ESOs they expect holders to forfeit before the vesting date and by using the average time to exercise in place of the time to expiration. Figure 3 compares the ESO cost estimates from this method of pricing to those from the modified BSM model and the lattice model based on the assumptions provided in Table 6 . ESO cost is calculated for a range of stock volatilities.
Figure 3 goes here
Using the expected term of the ESO in place of the time to expiration in the BSM model seems to lead to a reasonable approximation to the firm's cost of paying off its ESO obligations for low-volatility stocks (about 20% or below). However, this simplified procedure can lead to significant overpricing for high-volatility stocks (about 30% or higher). Bettis, Bizjak, and
Lemmon (2005) reach a similar conclusion. This potential overpricing should be a concern because firms with very-high-volatility stocks, such as technology firms, have been among the heaviest issuers of ESOs in their employee compensation plans. The overpricing is greater the higher is the firm's stock price volatility.
V. Conclusion
Public firms overwhelmingly choose the BSM model over other models to calculate their ESO expense. This paper modified the BSM option-pricing model in closed form to explicitly take into account an ESO's special vesting, lack of free transferability, forfeiture, and early exercise features. The modified BSM model is just as accurate as the trinomial lattice model but simpler to implement. A simple version, which values ESOs as of the grant date and can accommodate blackout periods, could be useful for financial reporting and compensation planning purposes.
Appendix. Derivation of the Modified BSM Model (7)
The integrand in equation (6) is the BSM formula. Evaluating equation (6) involves integrating the standard normal distribution function, which can be accomplished with formulas in Carr, Reiner, and Rubinstein (1995) . First write equation (6) as
The two integrals in equation (A1) can be evaluated using formula 7 on page 10 of Carr, Reiner, and Rubinstein (1995) . I reproduce this formula for the reader's convenience: For the general case of an ESO that may not be at-the-money at the time of issue, equation (A1) leads to the following expression for the value of an ESO that will vest in V T years: Ross (2007) expresses serious reservations about the reliability of ESOARS pricing. Ross (2007) argues that flaws in the design of ESOARS and structural flaws in the ESOARS auction process inhibit true price discovery, restrict competitive bidding, and cause the market-clearing price to "significantly understate the true cost of ESOs to the firm." However, Mazumdar, Nanda, and Surana (2007) find that following changes to the auction process the SEC requested in 2007, the "auction mechanism appears quite resilient in terms of delivering fair values of ESOs." 4 Paragraph A240 of FASB (2004) requires firms to identify the valuation method and disclose the following information on a weighted-average basis for all the option grants the firm made during the year: expected life, expected volatility, expected dividends, the risk-free interest rate, and the discount for post-vesting restrictions. The firm must also describe the method used to estimate each parameter value. 5 Carr and Linetsky's model with constant voluntary exercise rate λ e and constant forfeiture rate λ f can be reconciled with Carpenter's model by setting λ f equal to the stopping rate and choosing λ e to obtain similar voluntary early exercise behavior. It can be reconciled with Hull and White's model by setting λ f equal to the employee exit rate and choosing λ e to obtain voluntary early exercise behavior consistent with the early exercise multiple in Hull and White's model. 6 Firms sometimes offer employees the choice between ESOs and cash. The amount of cash would provide a measure of the ESOs' value if the amount of cash was determined without bias. The FASB rejected this approach because it concluded that firms tend to offer a relatively low alternative cash amount to induce employees to choose the ESOs (FASB, 1995, page 54). The FASB and the IASB have adopted substantially very similar rules for measuring the cost of employee services purchased with ESOs. Both use the fair value of the equity instruments the firm issues as the basis for measurement. Both view the vesting date as the issue date and consequently ignore the impact of the transfer restrictions prior to vesting. The effect is to measure the firm's cost of meeting its ESO obligations for ESOs that vest. The expense recorded at the time of grant is based on the number of ESOs the firm expects to vest. ESO expense is periodically adjusted up to the vesting date to reflect any differences between actual and expected vesting.
8
Some firms shortened the time to expiration when FAS 123 (R) became effective, presumably to reduce their reported ESO expense.
9
ESO plans typically allow a brief period within which recently departed employees (who left on good terms) must exercise ESOs or else forfeit them. Retirees and the estates of deceased former employees usually have longer exercise periods than employees who resign, but often these exercise periods expire before the original ESO expiration date.
10
In practice, firms often allow employees to exercise their in-the-money ESOs even when terminating them for cause in order to reduce the risk of a wrongful termination lawsuit, and employees forfeit only their out-of-the money ESOs.
11
Several other studies have also concluded that because of early exercise, ESOs are worth only about half the unadjusted BSM value to employees at the time of grant (Rubinstein, 1995; Carpenter, 1998; Carr and Linetsky, 2000; Meulbroek, 2001; Hall and Murphy, 2002; and Finnerty, 2005) .
12
If F 1 *=F 2 *=F*, then F* =λ f and E*= λ f + λ e where the λ's are Carr and Linetsky's (2000) conditional intensity factors. My model and Carr and Linetsky's intensity-based occupation time framework differ from Carpenter's (1998) stopping-time model in which voluntary early exercise is stock-price-sensitive and involuntary early exercise occurs randomly when a 'stopping event' occurs and the ESO is in-the-money. Forfeiture occurs in her model when a 'stopping event' occurs and the ESO is out-of-the-money. Carr and Linetsky (2000) also present an area option model in which the exercise intensity increases as the ESO becomes deeper in-the-money.
13 Equation (5) simplifies to the BSM formula when 0
. V E overstates the value of an ESO in the hands of the employee for three reasons. First, even if the exercise probabilities were known with certainty, ESOs are still nontransferable during the entire period the employee holds them. Second, the employee cannot hedge the risk that the ESO might never vest, and so a risk-averse employee would apply a more conservative estimate of A(T V ) than the one estimated from historical data. Third, the employee cannot hedge the risk that involuntary termination of employment would trigger forfeiture or early exercise. Thus, a risk-averse employee would tend to reduce (raise) by a greater amount the closer T n is to T E (T V ).
14
The transformations do not affect the probability that the ESO is in-the-money at any T n because replacing r and q with r* and q*, respectively, does not change d 2 .
15
The modified BSM model provides an upper bound on the value of ESOs to an employee. Risk-averse employees would apply greater discounts to the value of unrestricted ESOs than a well-diversified investor, especially if the employees are prevented by insider trading restrictions from selling the firm's stock short, buying put options, or engaging in other hedging strategies. For example, Rule 16-c under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits insiders from selling their firms' stock short. Thus, employees holding ESOs cannot hedge their risk exposure through short sales or options transactions involving their firms' stock, although other (imperfect) hedging strategies are available. The restrictions on hedging mean that ESO holders will tend to exercise sooner than they would in the absence of these restrictions, foregoing the remaining time value. The degree to which the model overstates the value of the ESOs in the hands of an employee depends on the employee's wealth and degree of risk aversion. Increasing the exercise and forfeiture rates appropriately in the model would be one way of adjusting for this risk aversion.
16
The model can be used to calculate the firm's cost of meeting its ESO payment obligations for FAS 123(R) reporting purposes. FAS 123(R) requires separate calculations of the 'fair value' of ESOs conditional on vesting occurring and of the number of ESOs in the grant that are expected to vest. Equation (7) already separates the two components. The first corresponds to the equation with A(T V ) = 1, and A(T V ) given by equation (2) is the second component.
17
A blackout period might increase ESO cost if it increases the average time to exercise. For example, an employee who wishes to exercise her ESOs but is prohibited by a blackout period will have to defer exercise to a later date. If the blackout restrictions delay exercise, rather than increase forfeitures, then ESO cost will increase. 18 This calculation assumes that the ESOs that holders forfeited had the same vesting schedule as the other ESOs the firm granted. For example, with four-year graded vesting, one-quarter of the forfeited ESOs are subtracted from the number of vested ESOs in year 1 after grant, one-half of the forfeited ESOs are subtracted from the number of vested ESOs in year 2, and so on.
19
The 2.03% for year 5 is partly due to one firm having 5-year graded vesting and partly due to the calendar-year basis on which the firms furnished the data. Some firms may have reported forfeitures that occurred just prior to final vesting on the fourth anniversary as occurring in the fifth calendar year.
20
The firm would actually perform the calculation in two steps, which I have collapsed into a single step. It would first calculate the ESO value without regard to pre-vesting forfeiture and then multiply this value by the fraction of ESOs that are expected to vest. No New ESOs Granted [5] 4 11 22
Notes:
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Source: Firm 10-K filings. This table summarizes the employee stock option valuation models S&P 500 firms used to calculate the ESO expense they reported in their Form 10-K filings with the SEC in 2006 , four firms used more than one model. Unspecified means that the firm did not identify the ESO valuation model in its Form 10-K report.
2007
Firms that stopped issuing employee stock options and reported no expense from stock options because all previously granted options were fully vested.
2008
Lattice model is used to value stock option grants that time vest, and Monte Carlo simulation model is used to value performance shares and barrier stock options, which vest, or include a provision for accelerated vesting, when the common stock price reaches specified levels. Black-Scholes model is used to value stock option grants that time vest, and performance-based options are valued using a Monte Carlo simulation model.
Includes firms that report that they use an "appropriate option pricing method in compliance with SFAS No. 123(R)" but do not disclose the specific model used.
Zions Bancorporation used its own ESOARS auction results. E is the annual percentage of available ESOs (vested, in-the-money, and neither exercised nor forfeited previously) that are exercised in year t. The data are taken from the separate grants for only those ESOs that were in-the-money sometime during the year for the ESO grant data underlying Table 2 . The exercise data for years 1 and 10 are excluded because none of the year 1 exercise rates reflect a full year of vesting and the year 10 exercise rates are affected by the added impact from expiration. The parameters are estimated using the Gauss-Newton method for generalized nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation (Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman, 1974 ). E* is estimated using equation (10) with λ = 0.08. z-statistics appear in parentheses. Table 4 This table furnishes the parameters estimated by fitting the diffusion process for the conditional exercise probability:
Public or

Company
Parameter Estimates for the Exercise Diffusions Table 3 . The parameters are estimated using the Gauss-Newton method for generalized nonlinear maximum likelihood estimation (Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman, 1974) . F* is estimated using equation (11) with λ = 0.08. z-statistics appear in parentheses. b The µ for each firm is the median of the annual µ values calculated for the firm. There was insufficient data to estimate µ for company 1.
Cost of ESOs
c Calculated as V E minus the trinomial lattice model value.
d Calculated as V E minus the µ model value. This table adjusts the cost of ESOs to allow for the impact of a blackout period by raising the post-vesting forfeiture rate. Four alternative adjustments are considered, which replace the original post-vesting forfeiture rate F 2 * with fractions of the difference between the pre-vesting and post-vesting forfeiture rates. Discount Due to Blackouts is calculated by dividing the difference between V E (no adjustment) and V E (adjusted for blackout periods) by V E (no adjustment). 
